警察不是失败

[编者注：本文最初出现在客座帖子上Marc Gunther's website，马克写下以下内容：

The COP15 meetings in Copenhagen left many of us discouraged, as Iwrote here。但是一些聪明的人正在仔细研究哥本哈根协议，并找到乐观的理由。一个是罗杰·巴伦丁, the president of绿色策略, a Washington-based consulting firm who is today's guest blogger. Roger's a longtime expert on the climate issue -- he served in the Clinton White House, as chairman of the White House Climate Change Task Force, and he remains a player in Washington environmental politics, as well as a Harvard-educated lawyer and clean tech investor. Roger will be among the speakers this year at FORTUNE's头脑风暴绿色conference on business and the environment. This is an edited version of post-COP15 memo that he shared with his clients and friends.

The Copenhagen Accord's approach to emissions reductions asks nations to propose and pledge to fulfill their own emissions commitments. This approach was proposed by Australia last spring and has been a favorite of American diplomats (going back to the Bush administration) who sometimes refer to it as a "bottom-up process." It's unlike the Kyoto Protocol, in which emissions reduction commitments were negotiated internationally.

根据协议，预计开发的国家将在2010年1月31日之前使用他们希望的任何基准年量化2020年的经济范围内排放目标。在京都协议的另一个暂停中，该协议还邀请发展中国家在1月31日之前提交其“全国适当缓解活动”。联合国发布的协议副本[PDF] does not yet list any national commitments, most nations have already said what their emission reductions or mitigation actions will likely be. For example, in November, President Obama pledged to reduce U.S. emissions by about of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 (consistent with the House-passed climate bill), and China agreed to reduce its "carbon intensity" (i.e. the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per unit of GDP) by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.

The Accord also includes two important financial commitments designed to address the needs of developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change. Collectively, developed countries pledged $30 billion in new and additional sources to the developing world for the period 2010-2012. The developed countries also agreed to provide up to $100 billion annually to the developing countries by 2020. The $100 billion is to come from public and private sources and be delivered both bilaterally and multilaterally. A "significant portion" of such funding is expected to flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, which the Accord establishes as a financial mechanism operating under the U.N.FCCC to support adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and forestry programs and policies.

Most importantly from the U.S. political perspective, the Copenhagen Accord requires transparency in the reporting of mitigation actions by developing countries. China had resisted international verification, but compromised in the final deal. As a result, mitigation actions taken by developing countries with financial support from the developed world will be subject to an international verification process.

这是哥本哈根的关键收费：

这是哥本哈根的关键收费：

国王死了。皇上万岁。The U.N. climate process has been badly weakened, but the likelihood of strong global action to address climate change has never been stronger.哥本哈根协定与COP-15无关，除了事实，即谈判它的领导人恰好是由于这一事实。

实际上，该协议是在没有绝大多数国家参与的情况下进行谈判的，因此不受全球一致性的要求 - 这是并且永远是不可能的。《哥本哈根协定》表明，将重点转移到经济联盟和论坛，尤其是在主要经济体中，因为将制定和实施气候政策的地方。像主要经济论坛或G-20以及主要的双边和区域协议，代表了创建市场和减少排放的更有效流程。

资本市场与碳市场。也许并不奇怪，以京都为导向的碳市场在哥本哈根进行了潜水。也许市场期望COP15更多。或参与者可能已经认识到，在联合国FCCC定义的碳价值仪器附近明确建立的市场可能没有持久力。

This is不是要说哥本哈根预示着减少碳的长期价值的下降 - 仅仅是两个原因。首先，如所讨论的，哥本哈根协议increasesthe likelihood of meaningful multilateral actions to reduce emissions. Inevitably, as the Accord says, markets and market mechanisms will be central to those efforts. Second, for the first time, the Accord calls for中期还原目标。与承诺大约2050年不同，“中期”（i.e.2020) is within the time-frame of many capital deployment decisions being made today and in the near future. For this reason, Copenhagen should invigorate carbon-impact evaluations of capital market decisions and increase the argument for carbon/climate informed business decision making.

发展中国家的三角剖分和商业提升。我们在美国的许多人长期以来一直认为，气候问题最好通过市场，投资和创新来解决 - 一旦游戏规则（其中至少是碳的定价）就位了。在国际规模上，这意味着商业和贸易可以创造财富，改善生活水平并减少排放。从历史上讲，并非没有理由，大多数发展中国家都以极大的怀疑来看待这一论点。当出现根据商业，投资和贸易与发达国家的选择，或者是基于另一方面的直接援助，几乎所有发展中国家都选择了后者。

《哥本哈根协定》揭示，一些主要发展中国家（尤其是中国，也许是印度）决定，他们在商业基础上比直接外国援助更好地互动 - 因此他们同意采用某种碳价格/影响市场的排放目标。现在，我们可能会看到更多的发展中国家渴望进入“商业”营地，而不是气候下的“援助”营地。

哥本哈根协定标志着国务卿希拉里·克林顿（Hilary Clinton）的承诺，国务卿对发展国家的承诺将为“发展中国家”提供1000亿美元。显着的不是承诺的规模，而是明确承认资金将是公共和私人资源的混合。协议的措辞小心翼翼地为私人资本和私营部门的行动打开了重要的作用，以减少排放，从本质上substitute提供一些传统援助。

现在取决于国会。No successful multilateral climate policy can work without the commitment and leadership of the U.S. The single biggest factor shaping the politics of t climate legislation in the U.S. has been the role of China, given its political profile and new status as the world's leading emitter. In Copenhagen, the U.S. demonstrated extraordinary leadership and effort (regardless of one's view of the outcome) and for the first time China made an emissions pledge with some degree of transparency.

For these reasons alone, I think both the global dialogue on climate and the prospects for domestic legislation were strengthened at COP15. Moreover, the broadening global movement toward a commerce-centric response to climate will present more opportunities for investment in lower carbon technologies. Smart companies will pursue competitive advantage from business practices and strategies aimed at reducing their climate impact.

点击这里for full coverage of COP15 from thegreenbiz.com和climatebiz.com团队，包括执行编辑Joel Makower和高级贡献者Marc Gunther的哥本哈根帖子，以及来自商业世界的数十名客人撰稿人。